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I NOTE ]
Constitutional Law - The Confrontation
Clause - The Emerging Trend of Literal
Interpretation - Illinois v. Fitzpatrick, 633
N.E. 2d 685 (Ill. 1994).
In Illinois v. Fitzpatrick,' the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a
statute enabling sexually abused children to present testimony via closed
circuit television 2 violated the provisions of the Illinois Constitution.3
The decision confirms the right of an Illinois criminal defendant to
personally confront a child witness who will present evidence against the
alleged offender at trial.4 While the decision to strike a witness
protection statute in favor of direct confrontation is not unprecedented,'
Fitzpatrick's rationale starkly contrasts with the analysis utilized for
nearly a century in assessing the protections afforded by the confrontation
clause.6
In its attempt to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system,
courts have traditionally assessed the scope of the confrontation clause
1. 633 N.E.2d 685 (III. 1994).
2. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38,para. 106B-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
3. Ill. Const. arts. 1, § 8.
4. For an overview of child witness protection statues in Illinois, see Jan Crawford, Young
Accusers Must Face Defendants at Sex Trials, Chi. Trib., Feb. 18, 1994, at 1.
5. States have been, and continue to be, divided on the question of whether the confrontation
clause requires a face-to-face encounter. Compare Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 SW.2d 224 (Ky.
1986) (holding that videotaped testimony of child abuse victim is an acceptable substitute to a face-
to-face confrontation) with Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1994) (declaring a statute
permitting videotaped testimony is repugnant to state constitution).
6. For a detailed background on the evolution of interpreting the Federal Confrontation Clause,
see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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through a balancing mechanism 7 and by considering the intentions of the
framers.' Fitzpatrick, in contrast, typifies a recent upsurge in a literal
approach to interpreting state confrontation clauses.9 The court in
Fitzpatrick failed to consider public policy or judicial necessity in its
interpretation.'" Instead, it opted to effectuate the literal meaning of the
text in a mechanical fashion." The shortcomings of interpreting the
confrontation clause in a purely literal manner are apparent upon analysis
of Fitzpatrick.2 While the Fitzpatrick court vigorously safeguarded the
text of the confrontation clause, the court's analysis, ironically,
jeopardizes the. very objectives of the clause.
In Illinois v. Fitzpatrick,"3 the defendant, George P. Fitzpatrick, was
charged with seven counts of Aggravated Sexual Criminal Assault 4 for
knowingly committing sexual penetration against four of his minor
grandchildren.' 5 The State, in a pre-trial motion, requested that the trial
testimony of the children, ages three to eight, be presented outside the
defendant's presence.' 6  The motion alleged that if the children were
unable to present their testimony through closed circuit television, the
children would suffer serious emotional consequences or might be
inarticulate witnesses at the trial.' 7
Thereafter, the Defendant moved to declare as unconstitutional the
act authorizing the out-of-court testimony." Citing the Illinois
confrontation clause, the defense argued that the statute eliminates the
face-to-face confrontation required by the state constitution. 19  The
Circuit Court of Clinton County held that the Child Shield Act was
unconstitutional, 2 and the State appealed to the Supreme Court of
7. Id. at 844.
8. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1985) (discussing the original intentions of the
framers).
9. Accord Louden, 638 A.2d at 953; Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991).
10. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 685.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for adiscussion ofthe potential consequences
of failing to consider human interests when interpreting the confrontation clause.
13. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 685.
14. 720 1LCS 5/12-14 (1994) (formerly cited at as 1ll. Rev. Slat. ch 38, para. 12-14 (1989).
15. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 685.
16. Id. at 686.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. IlM. Const art. 1, § 8 provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right.. . to meet the witnesses face to face . .
20. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688-89.
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Illinois.2 By a vote of 5-2, the supreme court affirmed the judgement
of the circuit court.22
The court began its analysis by declaring that the principles of
statutory construction are applicable to constitutional analysis. 23  In the
court's view, the fundamental goal of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. 24  According to the
court, these objectives are best evidenced by the actual language selected
by the drafters. "Clear and unambiguous" language, the court noted,
is not subject to judicial interpretation. 26  After enunciating these
guiding principles, the court opined that the Illinois confrontation clause
is "clear and unambiguous. '2 The court was therefore bound to the
literal meaning of the clause, which granted the accused the right to
"meet the witness face to face. 28 Since the statute abrogated the right
of a criminal defendant to personally confront a witness, the statute was
struck down as unconstitutional.29
The court then examined the State's contention that a criminal
defendant's right to confrontation is not abridged by the statute." The
State contended that the court should adopt the rationale of Maryland v.
Craig.3 Extending the same literal reasoning, the court differentiated
Fitzpatrick from the conflicting United States Supreme Court decision. 2
The court compared the phraseology of the Federal Confrontation
Clause33 with its Illinois counterpart. 4 The language variation, the
21. Id. at 686.
22. Id. at 689. The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the right to
confrontation was absolute under the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 689-90.
23. Id. at 687.
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. (citing Krafl Inc. v. Edgar, 561 N.E.2d 656 (111. 1990)
and explaining that legislative intent is best evidenced by the language chosen by the legislature).
26. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. (citing People ex reL. Baker v. Cowlin, 607 N.E.2d 1251
(III. 1992) (declaring clear statutory language is to be given intent without resort to other aids, such
as legislative history)).
27. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 688.
30. Id. at 687-88.
31. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
32. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687-88. In Craig, the court upheld a child witness protection
statute similar to the statute in Fitzpatrick The Court opined that the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee a criminal defendant the absolute right to meet a witness face-to-face at trial. Rather, the
central purpose of the Clause, ensuring the reliability of evidence, may be achieved through other
means such as cross-examination and the observation of the witness' demeanor by the trier of fact
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844-860 (1990).
33. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions ... the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against
them... ". U.S. Const. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
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court postulated, distinguishes the two provisions.35  The court
acknowledged that the Federal Confrontation Clause reflects a preference
for face-to-face confrontation, as opposed to a mandate.36 According to
the text of the Illinois confrontation clause, a personal encounter is
necessary.37  Therefore, the Fitzpatrick court dismissed Craig as
distinguishable to the instant case.38
The strength of a constitution lies in its flexibility. 39 A constitution
has the ability to grow and progress with a developing society. The
Confrontation Clause was incorporated into the Federal Constitution in
order to construct a "barrier" against trial abuses.4" The Clause's central
purpose was, and continues to be, ensuring fairness and integrity in
criminal proceedings."1 The primary mechanism in obtaining this goal
has been through the cross-examination of witnesses.42 Courts have
interpreted the right to confrontation in a manner consonant with
protecting the rights of the accused, as well as promoting the victim's
welfare.4 3  In some instances, public policy and case-specific
circumstances outweigh the defendant's interest in a face-to-face
confrontation with his or her accusers in court.44  In recent years, the
number of reported child abuse cases have increased disturbingly.45  An
34. The Illinois confrontation clause states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to . . . meet the witness face to face .... Ill. Const. art., I § 8. (emphasis added).
35. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688.
36. Id. See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (admitting prior
testimony and dying declarations where the declarant is deceased); Craig, 497 U.s. at 848 (citing
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (observing that literal reading of the Confrontation Clause
would eliminate virtually every hearsay exception).
37. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688.
38. Id.
39. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 231 (Ky. 1986).
40. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1990) Harlan,
J., concurring)); see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242 (concluding that an object of the Confrontation
Clause is to prevent trial abuses such as conviction by affidavit and absentee witnesses).
41. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 834; see also People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1119(111. 1976)
(concluding that, despite the difference in language, the Federal Confrontation Clause and its state
counterpart are meant to project the same interests).
42. See Tennant, 358 N.E.2d at 1149. In Tennant, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted tha
tcross-examination is the essential purpose of confrontation. According to the court, confronting the
witness is an "accidental" result of confrontation. Id. Cf Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024 (1987)
(quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157 (recognizing that the literalright to confront forms "the core of
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause")).
43. The United States Supreme Court described this balancing as follows: "[G]eneral rules
of law ... however beneficial in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
44. See, e.g., id. at 242-43.
45. For an account of the child abuse crisis in the United States, see Gail S. Goodman, et al.,
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
awareness of the difficulty involved in detecting and prosecuting these
crimes has also heightened.46 Simultaneously, the criminal justice
system has been criticized for its insensitive treatment of child
witnesses.47 In response, the majority of states have enacted legislation
to accommodate child witnesses.4" These statutes were promulgated to
insure the reliability of a child's testimony and to protect juvenile victims
from additional trauma and embarrassment.49
Sexually abused children are particularly vulnerable to the distresses
of the legal system.5" This anxiety is intensified when a child testifies
face-to-face against his or her alleged abuser in a courtroom.5 The
uneasiness associated with this confrontation may have a negative impact
on the child's ability to testify completely and accurately 52 and may also
distort the jury's evaluation of the testimony's truthfulness. 3
Additionally, the physical and psychological well-being of child witnesses
may be adversely impacted by facing an alleged abuser in open court.
54
As a result, a face-to-face confrontation is inconsistent with the state's
interest in promoting both reliable testimony and child welfare.55
Some courts, in contrast, have been critical of the child witness
protection statutes and have assessed their practical consequences
differently.56 These courts have noted that children are substantially
more vulnerable to suggestions than adults and may not be able to
differentiate truth from fantasy.57 By requiring a personal confrontation,
the youth may be deterred from telling falsehoods, or the child whose
Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, IS L. & HuM. BEHAV. 13 (1991).
46. Id. at 24. The difficulty, in large part, can be attributed to the fact that the abuser is often
a close friend or relative of the child, making it difficult for the victim to testify. In addition, often
there are no other witnesses except the victim and, without his or her testimony, there is no case.
Id.
47. For a discussion regarding the impact of the criminal justice system on children, see
generally Goodman, supra note 45.
48. For an explanation of the particular ameliorative measures, as well as a state-by state
statutory overview, see Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution: Should
the Bill of Rights Be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences? 53 Oio ST. L.J. 49, 54-58 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 231 (Ky. 1986) (intimidating child
witness as a factor in enacting statute).
50. See Goodman, supra note 45, at 13.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. at 29.
54. ld. at 21.
55. Several courts have reached this conclusion. E.G., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857
(1990); Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 991 (Ind. 1991).
56. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the underlying
motive of the statute is to assist prosecutors in getting more criminal convictions).
57. Id. See also King, supra note 48, at 90-93.
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testimony is prompted by an adult may be detected. 58 The results of the
court's balancing, however, are secondary to the actual balancing test
itself.
In assessing the constitutionality of a statute, a court's analytical
approach determines the threshold issue. The essential question in the
traditional test is whether the statute preserves the fairness envisioned by
the framers. 9 The particular provisions of the statute are integral in
determining if the legislation meets constitutional muster.6" While the
right to confrontation is not disregarded, the rights of the public are not
sacrificed in order to afford the accused with a nonessential benefit.6
The literal approach, exhibited in Fitzpatrick, considers only the text
of the constitution and whether the statute prohibits a face-to-face
confrontation.62  This mechanical reasoning presupposes literary
precision on the part of the framers. 3 Furthermore, this approach places
more credence in the court's own interpretation, than in Illinois precedent
that indicates the right of confrontation is not absolute.64
The most compelling criticism of the traditional approach is that the
interpretation is purely judicial interest-balancing.65 Courts utilizing
literal analysis, however, often employ a similar balancing test because
ascertaining whether the text is clear and unambiguous is necessarily
judicial interest-balancing.6 6 Regardless of their approach to interpreting
the clause, courts aim to effectuate ordinary legal meaning.
58. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964) (intimating that is may be more difficult to tell
a lie if directly confronted by the defendant).
59. People v. Tennant, 356 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Il1. 1976).
60. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
61. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (adhering to the technicalities of
constitutional provisions may occasionally be carried farther than the safety of the public will
warrant).
62. See Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
63. The Fitzpatrick court assumed that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended to
differentiate the state Confrontation clause from the federal Confrontation Clause solely because the
state clause contains the phrase "face-to-face" instead of "confront." See supra notes 33 & 34 for
the texts of both constitutional provisions.
64. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 101 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1951) (holding that criminal defendant
is not entitled as a matter of right to personally confront witness in proceedings to correct the record).
65. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 870 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conducting an
interest-balancing analysis and then adjusting the meaning of confrontation to comport with finding
is improper).
66. For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois opined in Fitzpatrick that the Confrontation
Clause was unambiguous and required no further interpretation. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. The
court opted, however, to employ a balancing test to interpret the state's double jeopardy clause which
provides: "No person shall ... twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill. Const. Art. I,
§ 10. The court considered the intent of the provision and read an exception into the seemingly
unambiguous language of the clause. See People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317 (Ill. 1993).
67. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 561 N.E.2d 656 (I1. 1990) (discussing the goals of statutory
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The confrontation clause and child witness protection statutes were
both framed in response to humane concerns.6" When a court balances
the competing interests of the defendant and the victim, the considerations
are unmistakably humane. In contrast, by interpreting the confrontation
clause in a literal vacuum, the court in Fitzpatrick eliminates from the
constitution and the statute, the pervasive element of humanity. Thus, the
more enlightened and accurate approach to determining whether the
clause is infringed is by focusing on the intentions conveyed by the
fiamers, not on the literal language.
If the movement toward a purely mechanical interpretation
continues, criminal defendants will embrace their state constitutions for
protections that were not intended by the framers. Furthermore, the
attempts of state legislatures to enact laws for the betterment of society
will be hampered. As Fitzpatrick illustrates, the court has removed the
humanity from the law; as a result, if the confrontation clause is
interpreted literally, the goal of a fair trial for both the defendant and the
victim may never be realized.
Michael K Gottlieb
interpretation).
68. See supra notes 6 & 45 and the accompanying text for a discussion regarding the humane
considerations that promulgated the clause and the statute.

